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Abstract
We consider the recursive Fourier sampling problem (RFS), and
show that there exists an interactive proof for RFS with an efficient
classical verifier and efficient quantum prover.
1 Introduction
The Recursive Fourier Sampling (RFS) problem is an oracle based decision
problem that was proposed by Bernstein and Vazirani in [BV97]. Historically,
RFS was the first problem that showed a relativized separation between BQP
and P.
Along with their definition of RFS, Bernstein and Vazirani also proved
a lower bound for the classical query complexity and an upper bound for
the quantum query complexity, establishing the P versus relativized BQP
separation. Later Aaronson [Aar03] proved matching lower bounds for the
quantum query complexity of RFS. Johnson [Joh08] extended and improved
these results, including bounds on the polynomial degree of RFS. Hallgren
and Harrow [HH08] subsequently generalized the recursive structure of the
problem to allow a super-polynomial speedup, relative to an oracle, based on
randomly generated quantum circuits.
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Bernstein and Vazirani also showed that RFS is not in NP. Aaronson
[Aar03] claims that the proof can be extended to show that RFS is not in
MA, and it has been conjectured by Vazirani and others that it is not even
in PH. This gives an oracle relative to which BQP is not in MA, and hope
that a relativized separation may be found between BQP and PH.
In the remainder of this section we recall the definition of the recursive
Fourier sampling problem and the optimal classical and quantum algorithms.
Our main contribution is in section 2, where we give an algorithm for an
interactive proof for RFS and show how the standard quantum algorithm
for RFS can be adapted to be used as an efficient prover for the interactive
proof.
1.1 The recursive Fourier sampling problem
We begin by defining a type of tree. Let n, l be a positive integers and consider
a symmetric tree where each node, except the leaves, has 2n children, and the
depth is l. Let the root be labeled by (∅). The root’s children are labelled
(x1) with x1 ∈ {0, 1}n. Each child of (x1) is, in turn, labelled (x1, x2) with
x2 ∈ {0, 1}n. We continue until we have reached the leaves, which are labelled
by (x1, . . . , xl). Thus each node’s label can be thought of as a path describing
how to find the node from the root.
Now we add the Fourier component to tree. We begin by fixing an effi-
ciently computable function g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}.1 With each node of the tree
(x1, . . . , xk) we associate a “secret” string s(x1,...,xk) ∈ {0, 1}n. These secrets
are promised to obey
g
(
s(x1,...,xk)
)
= s(x1,...,xk−1) · xk (1)
for k ≥ 1, and the inner product taken modulo 2. (Here we take s(x1,...,xk−1)
to mean s(∅) if k = 1.) In this way, each node’s secret encodes one bit of
information about its parent’s secret.
Now suppose that we are given an oracle A : ({0, 1}n)l → {0, 1} which
behaves as2
A (x1, . . . , xl) = g
(
s(x1,...,xl)
)
. (2)
1 For concreteness g(s) may be taken to be the sum of the components of s, modulo 3,
i.e. the number of 1s, or Hamming weight, of s modulo 3.
2 In fact the values s(x1,...,xl) are not necessary, since we can only ever learn g(s(x1,...,xl)).
However, including them in the definition eliminates special cases at the level l.
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Note that A works for the leaves of the tree only. Our goal is to find g
(
s(∅)
)
.
This is the recursive Fourier sampling problem (RFS).
At this point we wish to discuss the recursive nature of the RFS problem.
First, note that the subtree rooted at any node obeys the same promises as
the whole tree. Thus each subtree defines an RFS problem. (The subtree
rooted at a leaf is a trivial problem, where the oracle just returns the solu-
tion.) Thus we have a methodology for solving RFS problems: solve subtrees
in order to determine information about the root’s secret, then calculate the
secret. Solving subtrees uses the same method, except when we reach a
leaf, where the oracle is used instead. This is a type of top down recursive
structure, where the tree is built from a number of subtrees with the same
structure.
Another way of viewing the tree is from the bottom up. Note that if
we remove all the leaf nodes, truncating the tree, then the remaining tree
still obeys all the required promises. The oracle no longer returns relevant
information, however. This problem can be solved by building a new ora-
cle using the old one. The new oracle, given (x1, . . . , xl−1), calculates the
secret s(x1,...,xl−1) by accessing the old oracle. The new oracle then returns
g(s(x1,...,xl−1)). An oracle constructed in this way behaves exactly as the old
oracle does, but for the truncated tree. The tree can be truncated again to
depth l − 2 and another new oracle is built on the previous one. The result
is a recursive algorithm that eventually solves the RFS problem.
With a little thought, it is easy to see that both pictures of the recursive
structure of the RFS problem are essentially equivalent. Indeed, solving
a subtree rooted at (x1, . . . , xk) just means returning g(s(x1,...,xk)), which is
what the oracle for the tree truncated at level k does. However, each picture
can be useful in understanding the structure of algorithms.
1.2 Classical solution
Now let us consider the following solution to the recursive Fourier sampling
problem in the classical setting. To calculate g
(
s(∅)
)
we must first find s(∅).
To do so, let us define 1j to be the n-bit string with a 1 in the jth position
and 0 elsewhere. Define (s(∅))j to be the jth bit of s(∅), which is given by
s(∅) ·1j. These values are given by the solution to the RFS problem defined on
the subtree rooted at (x1) with x1 = 1j. After determining these values for
j = 1 . . . n we have determined s(∅). Hence we obtain the following algorithm:
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Algorithm 1 (RFS). Input: oracle A, subroutine g, l, k, (x1, . . . , xk)
1. If k = l then return A(x1, . . . , xl)
2. For j = 1 . . . n
(a) Set (s)j = RFS(A, g, l, k + 1, (x1, . . . , xk, 1j))
3. Return g(s)
Lemma 1. RFS(A, g, l, 0, ()) returns g(s(∅)).
Proof. We proceed by induction. We claim that for 0 ≤ k ≤ l
RFS(A, g, l, k, (x1, . . . , xk)) = g(s(x1,...,xk)). (3)
For k = l this is true by the definition of the oracle.
Now suppose that 0 ≤ k < l. By induction, step (a) sets (s)j =
g
(
s(x1,...,xk,1j)
)
which is promised to equal s(x1,...,xk) · 1j. Thus s = s(x1,...,xk)
and the function returns g(s(x1,...,xk)), as claimed. Calling RFS(A, g, l, 0, ())
then returns g
(
s(∅)
)
.
The query complexity of this algorithm is nl, which can be seen since
each call to RFS calls itself n times, and the depth of recursion is l.
This solution is due to Bernstein and Vazirani [BV97], who also gave a
matching lower bound on the number of queries, so the query complexity is
Θ(nl).
1.3 Quantum solution
We now consider the analogous quantum problem, where the oracle A allows
quantum access according to
A |x1〉 . . . | xl〉 | y〉 = |x1〉 . . . | xl〉
∣∣ y ⊕ g(s(x1,...,xl))〉 . (4)
In addition, we have an efficient quantum algorithm which calculates g as
G | s〉 | y〉 = | s〉 | y ⊕ g(s)〉 . (5)
The main idea behind the algorithm is to use the fact that H⊗n transforms
| y〉 into ∑x(−1)x·y |x〉 and vice versa. We use phase feedback and a call
to A to create the state
∑
xl
(−1)s(x1,...,xl−1)·xl |x〉, then apply H⊗n to obtain∣∣ s(x1,...,xl−1)〉. After calculating g(s(x1,...,xl−1)), we uncompute ∣∣ s(x1,...,xl−1)〉 to
disentangle this register from other registers.
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Algorithm 2 (QRFS). Input: oracle A, subroutine Gj, l, k, quantum reg-
isters X1, . . . ,Xk, Y.
1. If k = l then apply A to (X1 . . .Xl) and Y, then return.
2. Introduce ancilla Xk+1 in the state 1√2n
∑
xk+1∈{0,1}n | xk+1〉Xk+1.
3. Introduce ancilla Y ′ in state 1√
2
(| 0〉Y ′ − | 1〉Y ′).
4. Call QRFS(A,G, l, k + 1, (X1 . . .Xk+1),Y ′)
5. Apply H⊗n on register Xk+1.
6. Apply G to Xk+1 and Y.
7. Apply H⊗n on register Xk+1.
8. Call QRFS(A,G, l, k + 1, (X1 . . .Xk+1),Y ′)
9. Discard Xk+1 and Y ′.
10. Return
Lemma 2. QRFS(A,G, l, 0, (), |0〉) returns ∣∣ g(s(∅))〉.
Proof. To analyze the correctness of the algorithm we proceed by induction
with the hypothesis that for each 0 ≤ k ≤ l, QRFS(A,G, l, k, (X1 . . .Xk),Y)
applied to | x1〉 . . . |xk〉 | y〉 gives
|x1〉 . . . |xk〉
∣∣ y ⊕ g (s(x1,...,xk))〉 . (6)
(The output for general input states is determined by linearity.) This is true
for k = l by definition of the oracle.
Now let 0 ≤ k < l. We introduce the state 1√
2
(| 0〉 − | 1〉) in step 3 in
order to use phase kickback. By hypothesis, then, step 4 introduces phase
of (−1)g(s(x1,...,xk+1)), which is the same as (−1)s(x1,...,xk)·xk+1. The state after
step 4 is thus
1√
2n
∑
xk+1
(−1)s(x1,...,xk)·xk+1 |x1〉 . . . |xk+1〉 | y〉 | −〉 . (7)
After step 5 the state then becomes
|x1〉 . . . |xk〉
∣∣ s(x1,...,xk)〉 | y〉 | −〉 . (8)
5
Step 6 changes | y〉 to ∣∣ y ⊕ g (s(x1,...,xk))〉. Next, steps 7 and 8 uncompute
the Xk+1 register, so it and the Y ′ register are returned to their original state
when they are discarded in step 9. Thus we obtain the required output state.
From the inductive hypothesis, we see that QRFS(A,G, l, 0, (),Y) ap-
plied to | 0〉 gives ∣∣ g (s(∅))〉.
Note that if we apply QRFS(A,G, l, k, (X1 . . .Xk),Y) to |x1〉 . . . |xk〉 | y〉,
and stop after step 5, we obtain
∣∣ s(x1,...,xk)〉 in the Xk+1 register. This is
equivalent to solving the RFS problem defined by the subtree rooted at
(x1, . . . , xk). Thus we can also efficiently calculate any s(x1,...,xk).
This algorithm is due to Bernstein and Vazirani [BV97]. The quantum
query complexity of this algorithm is O(2l), since two recursive calls are
made, and the depth is l. Aaronson [Aar03] gave a matching lower bound.
1.4 Complexity implications
In the previous sections we have kept both n, the size of the bit strings,
and l, the depth of the tree. Typically, RFS is considered with l = log2 n.
In this case we obtain query complexities of Θ(nlog2 n) classically, and O(n)
quantumly. Hence we obtain the relativized separation of BQP * P. It is
also for this value of l that RFS /∈ MA.
2 Interactive proof
Suppose now that we have, in addition to the oracle A and classical com-
puting resources, access to a prover P who has more powerful computing
resources. We have seen that for the choice l = log2 n there is no way of
efficiently computing the solution to the recursive Fourier sampling problem
directly. In fact, since RFS is not in NP, we cannot even efficiently verify a
solution if it is given (along with a short proof.) We will show, however, that
by interacting with P we can efficiently compute the solution, or detect if P
is giving false information. That is, RFS is in IP.
It is not surprising that RFS is in IP, indeed BQP ⊆ IP in the unrelativized
world. However, IP is defined with an computationally unbounded prover,
and here we will see that for RFS it suffices to have an efficient quantum
prover.
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2.1 Classical verifier
Looking back at the original classical solution to RFS in Algorithm 1 we
see that there are two steps: find s(x1,...,xk) and calculate g(s(x1,...,xk)). The
difficult part is finding s(x1,...,xk), so we can instead ask P to do this for us.
Since we do not trust P , we should perform some type of test to see whether
P has really given us the correct value of s(x1,...,xk).
Suppose that P gives us a string s′(x1,...,xk). In principle we can detect
the case s′(x1,...,xk) 6= s(x1,...,xk) by instead looking at whether s′(x1,...,xk) ·xk+1 =
s(x1,...,xk) · xk+1 for a randomly chosen xk+1 ∈ {0, 1}n. If s′(x1,...,xk) 6= s(x1,...,xk)
then s′(x1,...,xk) · xk+1 6= s(x1,...,xk) · xk+1 for half of all strings xk+1 ∈ {0, 1}n. If
we check for c independently chosen strings xk+1 then we will fail to detect
P ’s deception with probability 2−c.
Since we have s′(x1,...,xk), we can calculate s
′
(x1,...,xk)
· xk+1 readily, but how
do we find s(x1,...,xk) · xk+1? We use recursion: we ask P for s(x1,...,xk+1) and
again perform the test. After the recursion is deep enough, we can query the
oracle directly to find s(x1,...,xl−1) · xl = A(x1, . . . , xl).
Algorithm 3 (VERIFIER). Input: Oracle A, Prover P , subroutine g, total
number of levels l, current level k, queries (x1, . . . xk).
1. If k = l then return A(x1, . . . , xl)
2. Query P for s′(x1,...,xk)
3. Repeat 3 times:
(a) Randomly choose xk+1 ∈ {0, 1}n
(b) Set a = VERIFIER(A, P, g, l, k + 1, (x1, . . . , xk+1))
(c) If a 6= s′(x1,...,xk) · xk+1 then abort
4. Return g(s′x1,...,xk)
We must also specify what the behaviour of P should be. When P receives
a query (x1, . . . , xk), it should return a string s
′
(x1,...,xk)
∈ {0, 1}n. For an
honest P this should be equal to s(x1,...,xk).
Clearly there exists a prover P which always returns s(x1,...,xk) when queried:
P can solve a subtree of the full RFS problem, rooted at (x1, . . . , xk) to find
s(x1,...,xk). For such a prover, we may perform VERIFIER(A, P, g, l, 0, ()) to
obtain g
(
s(∅)
)
, which is the answer to the RFS problem.
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Lemma 3. Let P be a prover that always returns s′(x1,...,xk) = s(x1,...,xk) when
queried. Then
VERIFIER(A, P, g, l, 0, ()) = g(s(∅)). (9)
Proof. We proceed via induction, as in previous proofs. We claim that for
0 ≤ k ≤ l
VERIFIER(A, P, g, l, k, (x1, . . . , xk)) = g(s(x1,...,xk)). (10)
This is true for k = l from the definition of the problem and line 1. For k < l
we see from line 4 that the claim holds for this choice of P so long as the
algorithm does not abort in line (c).
Now suppose that 0 ≤ k < l. By induction, step (b) sets a = g(s(x1,...,xk+1)) =
s(x1,...,xk−1) · xk by the definition of the problem. Again, by the choice of P
this is always equal to s′(x1,...,xk−1) · xk and the algorithm never aborts.
Our next concern is what the algorithm does when interacting with a
prover P that is not return correct strings. The next lemma says that the
algorithm returns an incorrect result with low probability; the rest of the
time the algorithm aborts. Hence we are protected from a malicious P .
Lemma 4. For any P , the probability that VERIFIER(A, P, g, l, 0, ()) does
not abort and returns a value not equal to g(s(∅)) is at most 14 .
Proof. Let pk, 0 ≤ k ≤ l be the probability that VERIFIER does not abort
and returns a value that is not equal to g(s(x1,...,kk)). To be precise, we should
specify what P does, since pk can depend on P ’s behaviour. Let us then take
the maximal pk over all choices of P , which will give us an upper bound for
any particular P .
We proceed by induction with the hypothesis that pk ≤ 1/4. For k = l
this true since A(x1, . . . xl) = g(s(x1,...,xl)) so pl = 0.
Now suppose that 0 ≤ k < l. There are two cases. First, P returns
s′(x1,...,xk) such that g(s
′
(x1,...,kk)
) = g(s(x1,...,kk)). In this case VERIFIER al-
ways returns the correct value, so pk = 0. Note that VERIFIER may still
abort, since s′(x1,...,xk) may not equal s(x1,...,xk), or the recursion may return an
incorrect result.
Now consider the case where P returns some s′(x1,...xk) such that g(s
′
(x1,...xk)
) 6=
g(s(x1,...xk)). If the algorithm does not abort in line (c) then one of two things
happened: either s′(x1,...xk) ·xk+1 = s(x1,...xk) ·xk+1 for this choice of xk+1, which
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happens with probability 1
2
, or s′(x1,...xk) · xk+1 6= s(x1,...xk) · xk+1 and at the
same time the recursion in (b) returns an incorrect value. The latter two
events occur together with probability at most
pk+1
2
. Thus, for each of the
three repetitions, the probability of not aborting is at most 1
2
(1 + pk+1) and
the overall chance of not aborting is
pk ≤ 1
23
(1 + pk+1)
3 . (11)
By the induction hypothesis, pk+1 ≤ 14 . Then
pk ≤ 1
8
(
1 +
1
4
)3
=
125
512
≤ 1
4
. (12)
Using induction, we obtain the result for 0 ≤ k ≤ l. In particular, p0 ≤ 1/4,
which is the desired result.
Corollary 1. VERIFIER(A, P, g, l, 0, ()) solves the recursive Fourier sam-
pling problem with completeness 1 and soundness 1/4.
The algorithm uses 3l queries to the oracle and fewer than 3l to the prover.
With the choice l = log2 n this is polynomial in n.
2.2 Quantum prover
Although the class IP is usually defined for a computationally unbounded
prover, it happens that for RFS and the verifier presented above, the prover
can be an efficient quantum prover. That is, if the prover is quantum then
it need only make a polynomial number of queries to the oracle.
As mentioned in section 1.3, algorithm 2 makes at most 2l queries to
find s(∅) and can be adapted to find s(x1,...,xk) using at most this number of
queries. We can thus readily adapt algorithm 2 to create a prover for the
above classical verifier. The total number queries that the prover will make
is less than 3l2l ≤ n2.58.
3 Discussion
Recently there has been interest in interactive proofs in a quantum context
and, most relevant here, interaction between quantum provers and classi-
cal verifiers. Work in this direction began with Mayers and Yao [MY04],
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and Magniez et al. [MMMO06] who showed how to classically verify (with
certain assumptions) the operation of quantum apparatus, including entire
circuits. Recently, Aharonov et al. [ABOE08] and Broadbent et al. [BFK09]
considered verifiers with limited quantum capabilities. As well, Broadbent
et al. demonstrated an interactive protocol, which has the full power of BQP,
between two entangled, but non-communicating, efficient quantum provers
and an efficient classical verifier. Ideally we would like to show that that
every problem in BQP has an interactive proof with a single efficient quan-
tum prover and a classical verifier (let us call the class of such problems
IPBQP.) Unfortunately, self-testing and the Broadbent et al. protocol both
rely fundamentally upon non-local properties of quantum theory, making the
techniques unsuitable to the single-prover scenario.
In this context, the current work is interesting because it shows that there
is an oracle relative to which IPBQP * MA3. Since BQP ⊆ PSPACE = IP
an interactive proof exists for every problem in BQP, but the only known
construction, due to Shamir [Sha92], uses a PSPACE prover. The interest for
the current result, then, is the fact that the interactive proof has an efficient
quantum prover.
Another interesting aspect of this work is the fact that the structure of
the interactive proof is not informed by the structure of the prover but arises
naturally from the structure of the problem. This is in contrast to results
in [MMMO06] and [BFK09], which essentially analyze the quantum provers
in action to verify correct operation. This may indicate that a different
methodology from these partial results is necessary, or at least useful, in
order to reduce the number of provers down to one.
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